Why the series is structured this way
A line may operate for decades. Software, contractors and ownership can change. The manufacturer determines what a device can do, the integrator connects devices into a system, and the operator controls routine access and maintenance. ISA and IEC describe a scope spanning these parties and the life of the system. The series gives them a common language for responsibilities and evidence.
| Question | Relevant part | What the plant gets |
|---|---|---|
| How do we manage security during use? | 2-1, asset owner’s security programme | Responsibilities and continuing processes for changes, incidents and other activities |
| What should we require from the service provider? | 2-4, service provider programme | Agreed integration and maintenance practices and evidence |
| How much protection does this line need? | 3-2, risk assessment for system design | Defined boundaries, assessed zones and conduits, justified targets |
| What must the assembled system be capable of? | 3-3, system requirements | Testable capabilities of the integrated solution |
| What can a product supplier demonstrate? | 4-1 for development and maintenance, 4-2 for components | Evidence for a defined process or a named product |
One line, two distinct connections
A packaging line sends counts to planning. The integrator occasionally needs engineering access. Define the line’s boundary and the consequences of losing each connection or allowing an unauthorised change. Group assets with common protection needs into zones. Consider the protection needed for communication paths between them, called conduits. The resulting requirement might allow planning to receive approved production data while requiring separate authorisation for maintenance changes. Demonstrate that behaviour on the integrated system.
What a security level means
SL-T represents the target established for the area under consideration. SL-C describes a system or component capability. SL-A refers to the level achieved in context. Technical requirements cover seven areas: identification and authentication, use control, system integrity, data confidentiality, restricted data flow, timely response to events and resource availability. A zone may need different targets across these areas.
Consider a remote service session. Which individual account did the technician use to sign in? Is that technician authorised to change a parameter on this machine? How can maintenance then establish whether the parameters still match the approved settings? These questions concern user identity, permissions and data integrity.
When purchasing, ask for the part and edition, system boundary, requirements covered and evidence. A component certificate can be valuable within its stated scope. For a line’s service connection, also establish how the component is integrated, configured and used.
Related reading
- How do you assess the security risk of a particular line?
- Which connections does the machine need?
- What should we agree before buying a connected machine?
- Existing machines in Germany: when does cybersecurity affect worker safety?